

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STABILITY & RECONSTRUCTION?

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ABSTRACT

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Although planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq began just weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, attention to post-conflict operations was ineffective and in many cases completely overlooked. There was apparent confusion on whether the Department of Defense or the Department of State had planning responsibility. Many of the planning assumptions were overly optimistic, naive and some were just flat wrong. The reason every level of command from strategic to tactical ineffectively planned for post conflict operations may be found in our American cultural understanding of how and when to go to war and in our understanding of how to resolve the issues after major combat operations. The requirement for the U. S. military to plan and conduct stability and reconstruction operations should not be a surprise; in fact there are many examples of these type operations in American historical military experience. Even assuming that a Department of State led coalition is created and the interagency directs stability and reconstruction operations, it will be the professional military officer that will execute the operation. During United States only or coalition lead operations the American soldier will be required for phase IV and therefore he should plan accordingly.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STABILITY & RECONSTRUCTION?

We're going to turn the city of As Samawah back to the people, and then move north to our next mission; we are not going to be occupiers.¹

—82d Airborne Division Commander
(5 April 2003)

On 6 April, 2003 in the city of As Samawah Iraq, after seven continuous days of combat operations the Fedyeen and Republican Guards units were destroyed and the tactical situation was secure. The 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division continued to attack north toward Ad Diwaniyah and Karbala leaving 1st Battalion 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment in the city.² The battalion's mission was to secure the Major Supply Route (MSR) that ran through the city and across the Euphrates River. The purpose was to allow freedom of movement for V Corps logistics as 3d Infantry Division continued to attack toward the capital. Baghdad would not be secured for at least another four days. The problem the battalion faced was how to maintain security of an MSR that ran through the middle of a relatively large city. Several major battles had caused civilian casualties and considerable damage to the infrastructure, particularly water and electricity. The Ba'athist business managers and governmental officials were all killed, captured or fleeing and none of their duties had been preformed since the second week in March. The city of approximately 100,000 people was without a mayor, a police force, a fire department, a sanitation department or a city council. In a managerial sense the municipality was completely dysfunctional. Although not in any mission statement or order received or issued at the tactical level, it was clear that in order to keep the MSR through the city and across the Euphrates River open, the battalion would have to maintain civil order. This task required reconstruction of basic city governmental and infrastructural functions. The overall focus for the coalition force in Iraq was still major combat operations to destroy the Iraqi military capability and to secure Baghdad; but the focus in As Samawah had shifted to maintaining security and rebuilding basic governmental functions. To be successful the coalition would have to simultaneously conduct Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) operations in southern cities like As Samawah and major combat operations to secure central cities like Baghdad. There had been an incorrect assumption that a Department of State representative would arrive as soon as military objectives were achieved and allow tactical units to "move north to our next mission." The incomplete planning of phase IV operations at the strategic and operational level forced improvisation at the tactical level. It was not clear until the night of 6 April, 2003 that phase IV planning and execution for the city of As Samawah was a tactical military responsibility. The

reason every level of command from the strategic to tactical ineffectively planned for post conflict operations (phase IV) can possibly be explained by reviewing how conflicts are actually resolved, how Americans view war overall and from a review of American historical military experience with post conflict operations. By gaining an understanding of why and how Americans fight, several lessons at the strategic, operational and tactical levels appear that when understood and institutionalized may prevent the same errors from occurring during our next major combat operation.

Conflict Resolution

There are many ways to define success in war and General Patton's view that victory is achieved by killing the enemy is often seen as the military solution.³ Although it is extremely important to have the ability to defeat an opponent's military, the goal should not necessarily be to kill him, but rather to affect his will. For a conflict to be completely resolved the opponent must eventually change his mind. He must both recognize the value of the victor's political objectives and take them as his own or he must understand that continued resistance will mean certain loss of greater values than the objectives he seeks. Therefore strategists must see well past the military defeat of a foe and define victory in terms of desired political end-states or we can expect, as Liddell Hart says, "the germs of another war to grow."⁴

Conflict resolution occurs when minds are changed and overall objectives are agreed upon. A nation has many elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) to assist in achieving these objectives and ideally minds can be changed through the non-military elements of national power before hostilities escalate to full combat operations. If the destruction of an adversary's military and the removal of his government are the political objectives, then the plan must include how to reestablish security and governmental functions once these objectives are achieved. Success will require some significant security, organizational, infrastructural and political requirements across the country. It is reasonable to assume that if a government is removed, the victor must assume these roles until a new "supported" government is established. Tying the security, organizational, infrastructural and political requirements to specified tactical tasks during stability and reconstruction operations is critical in managing the expectations and providing guidance to all organizations involved in executing these tasks. If a nation is defeated militarily but the population does not accept the methods of reconstruction of the newly established government, the fight will most likely continue in the form of an insurgency or through civil disobedience.⁵ Victory, therefore, must not be defined in terms of "making the enemy die for his country" but in terms that the conquered

adversary will accept the desired end states and political objectives of the victor. To achieve a long term victory the tactical task of killing the enemy and rendering a country's military ineffective will not be sufficient. "It is essential to conduct war with a constant regard to the peace you desire."⁶ You should never take the first step without considering the last.

"American Way of War"

American politicians traditionally have had difficulty defining clear objectives and desired end-states because of "personal agendas, institutional biases, congressional pressures, domestic politics, and the emotionalism created by American lives invested in the conflict."⁷ During the initial phases of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the U.S. military was focused on decisively defeating Iraq's conventional military forces and overthrowing Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. These objectives were accomplished very quickly because the U. S. military developed a conventional doctrine over time designed to execute quick decisive actions, with overwhelming combat power.⁸ This military doctrine follows the general American view that war is a necessary evil and has to be concluded as decisively and rapidly as possible.⁹ Colin Gray in his article, *"Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?"* argues that there are 13 characteristics that define the "American Way of War" and that our adherence to them is the major reason Americans struggle with any military operation where we do not have, or can not use overwhelming force. He argues that our national actions in regard to war are extremely predictable and follow these thirteen attributes.¹⁰

These characteristics along with Clausewitz's ideas of center of gravity, decisive point, overwhelming combat power and destruction of an enemy force merge to create a picture of how the U. S. military developed into the premier conventional fighting force.¹¹ These ideas were enhanced and developed as we trained to fight the Soviet Union in places like the Fulda Gap in Central Europe during The Cold War. They were further fueled by recent quick military victories in Grenada and Panama. The military defeats of Saddam's armed forces during the first Gulf War and during OIF as well as the defeat of the Taliban during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) are additional examples of these ideas seen as conventional military successes. Vietnam is usually cited as an example of failure when the United States was unable to employ overwhelming combat power to achieve a quick decisive outcome.¹² This American war fighting culture has a profound impact on how we see ourselves and our enemies. The importance of placing overwhelming combat power at a decisive place is developed in all U.S. Army officers from commissioning programs through advanced schooling.

America's decisions about the use of force after 9/11 reinforced this "way of war." The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in the deaths of more than 3,000 innocent people and focused the nation on the basic values of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. President Bush spelled out in his opening letter of the National Security Strategy that the government's most solemn obligation is to protect the security of the American people.¹³ America expected immediate justice for those terrorist events and the country leadership selected the military instrument of power as the primary method of engagement. In line with "The American Way of War," the stated objectives were liberation the Afghanistan and Iraqi people; regime change in both countries; elimination of weapons of mass destruction; and the destruction of Taliban and Iraqi conventional forces.¹⁴

The Department of Defense was successful in destroying the Taliban armed elements, removing Saddam from power and destroying the Iraqi Army. Where our national objectives fell short was in the patient, long range vision that takes into account not only how a war is terminated but also what is expected for the conflict to be completely resolved. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine states that American Forces should not be committed without a clear threat to national interest, clearly defined political objectives, full support of the American people, with overwhelming force and only as a last result. In the case of Iraq, this doctrine may have indirectly limited the President's use of other instruments of national power.¹⁵ The desired political objective for the U.S. military's combat power in Iraq should have been establishing the required security environment for successful economic and political reconstruction after the regime had fallen; instead of the destruction of military forces in order to cause the regime to fall. This modification in political objectives alone could have placed priority on the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power, refocused tactical commanders and significantly changed the progress made in the first 30 days after the regime fell and the Iraqi army dissipated.

Our initial success in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the success of the United States Military combative attitude, doctrine and training. These same characteristics, however, may have also been the greatest draw-back as the military transitioned to fighting an insurgency and conducting stability operations. The understanding that defeat of an enemy force is just a beginning and not an end and that war is conducted as a function and continuation of policy¹⁶ has created the greatest change in how we plan, train and execute the fight since 9/11. As training is continually tailored to fight battles that will surely follow; the United States governmental agencies must work to adapt all of these characteristics to understand how all major parties will resolve the issues central to why the fight began. It is reasonable to assume

that if Colin Gray is correct, this American view of war and a misunderstanding of how conflicts are fully resolved could be part of the reason the post combat operations planning for OIF-I was flawed.

America's Past Experience (Stability & Reconstruction)

American military forces want to quickly win wars and go home. They prefer to not perform stability and reconstruction type operations and when they are required the military desires to hand them off to other U.S. government agencies or international organizations quickly. Historically, the United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended American military presence.¹⁷ Even from our earliest experience with war in the American Revolution (1775-1783) the importance of security for the population and the value of basic governmental expectations are evident. The disdain and disrespect toward individuals and local populations by the English government unified the resistance against the local British authorities. Although the colonialists were greatly outmatched militarily, their determination and popular support of the fight was the foundation for the defeat of a super power and the creation of a new country. A long practice of militia use in support of local populations began from this tradition and continues with our National Guard and Reserves.

A review of the American Civil War (1861-1865) from the South's perspective also gives some insight to the importance of civil support for a politically motivated cause. The majority of the Southern population fully supported the Confederacy and played a significant role in their ability to sustain the fight even though they were greatly outnumbered and out resourced by the North. General Order 100 issued by Abraham Lincoln specified the humane treatment of soldiers and civilians after the war. This document outlines the actions expected of soldiers and government officials and demonstrates President Lincoln's understanding of the importance of planning for stability and reconstruction before the fighting ends.¹⁸ The harsh treatment by many Northern administrators (known in the South as "Carpet Baggers") is an example of how after major combat operations a new government can be resented by the local population. This harsh treatment was arguably a catalyst in the development of civil disobedience by such radical organizations as the Klu Klux Klan. If this relationship had worsened and if the local populations had not been eventually provided with basic governmental functions of security and governance, the situation could have led to a population supported insurgency. The Confederate States were eventually drawn back into the Union by recognizing and accepting the value of the country's political objectives and understanding that continued resistance meant

certain loss and greater personal and institutional destruction than their value of individual states rights or of slavery.

During the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1913), the organized Philippine Army dissolved early in the conflict and soldiers operated as insurgents from villages and the countryside. Telegraph wires were cut, convoys ambushed, and Filipinos willing to work with the American civil government were murdered. Gangs of thieves also proliferated, exploiting the lack of civil order to establish their own criminal fiefdoms.¹⁹ In the process of building local support, U. S. Army commanders found themselves constantly working reconstruction operations in conjunction with fighting an insurgency. The United States was eventually successful in the Philippines by supporting and protecting local leaders that actively opposed the guerrillas' attempts to establish networks inside their towns. Success was obtained by gradually transferring power to responsible and sustainable institutions of self-governance.²⁰ This is also an example of the importance of legitimacy and that insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are won or lost through the support of local populations.

A review of the conclusion of World War I (WW I) demonstrates the importance of conflict termination and conflict resolution. Arguably, World War II (WW II) began because the issues at the heart of the First World War were not resolved by the fighting; and that the requirements in the Treaty of Versailles were vindictive toward defeated populations rather than seeking overall resolution of issues. WW II is a great example of the importance of coalitions and the success possible when reconstruction operations are planned years in advance. Military governmental teams were developed as early as 1941 and moved into German towns in 1944 along with the leading combat troops. These teams moved with lead fighting units, occupied local government offices, and swiftly established their authority.²¹ Time and effort was spent developing stability and reconstruction plans well before the fighting ended and is contributable to the success enjoyed in both Germany and Japan after the major fighting terminated.²²

Much written history exists about the United States success and failures in Vietnam from 1954 to 1975. Combat missions ranged from guerrilla warfare to conventional high intensive combat operations. The importance of stability and reconstruction operations that focused on "winning the hearts and minds" of the local South Vietnamese people was emphasized during training and combat operations. Following the experiences in Vietnam a generation developed in America with the intent of not again becoming involved in a protracted conflict.²³

The U. S. military was also involved in reconstruction type tasks in other conflicts such as Grenada, Panama and Haiti but these operations were conducted over relatively short periods of time, focused on quickly attainable military objectives and at a relatively low cost in terms of

American lives and dollars. These governments were replaced by national leadership that was accepted by the local populations and also by the international community. Today, the American military is still involved in stability and reconstruction operations in places like Bosnia and Kosovo as a coalition partner with The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and The United Nations. It is noteworthy that although Americans favor short decisive operations, historically the military is more often engaged in protracted conflicts and is responsible for stability and reconstruction in almost every conflict it has entered. This bias toward short, decisive operations may also help explain how military and civilian leadership may have been short sighted during the planning for OIF-I post combat operations.

Observations

There are six major historical observations that may be useful when comparing stability and reconstruction decisions and the actions taken by strategic, operational and tactical commanders during the planning and execution of OIF-I. First, American's prefer short decisive operations rather than prolonged nation building engagements. Second, conflicts are seldom resolved at the end of Major Combat Operations (MCO) and populations are a critical factor in conflict resolution. Third, the time to beat an insurgency is before it begins. Fourth, legitimacy of the government in the eyes of local populations is critical for stability. Fifth, the military will be directly involved in civil operations immediately following combat and sixth, stability and reconstruction operations will begin earlier in some areas than in others. Examining each of these observations in relationship to each other and the planning considerations for OIF-I may explain how commanders at all levels could have misunderstood the full requirements for post combat operations.

Americans have a preference toward short decisive engagements rather than prolonged nation-building operations. This idea is in line with Colin Gray's 13 characteristics for the "American Way of War" and may help explain why collectively Americans tend to have a short memory in reference to past involvement in prolonged engagements. A military focus on conventional training and operations and a dislike for protracted wars led to many incorrect assumptions during OIF-I planning. Assumptions were made throughout the U. S. government that Iraqi flag waving crowds would greet coalition forces; the population would support Ahmed Chalabi; the Iraqi Army, police and civil government officials would still function; coalition reconstruction support would arrive immediately; and that reconstruction task would be controlled by an Iraqi interim government with minimum support required by the coalition.²⁴ Optimistic tactical decisions that followed these assumptions led commanders to focus on

military tasks and failed to understand the importance of reconstruction on overall success. This national, strategic and operational bias toward quick decisive operations translated at the tactical level into incorrect planning for what would happen immediately after the Iraqi army was defeated and the government collapsed. The fact that the 82d Airborne Division Commander had no desire to stay in As Samawha²⁵ and that the 1st Battalion 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment had no immediate plan for reconstruction of basic infrastructure or governance, is an example of how this American public view of war influences operations from strategic to tactical. The American Way of War and the military preference for quick decisive operations led directly to strategic, operational and tactical complications for phase IV planning and negatively affected local populations during execution.

Gaining support of the population is extremely important to achieve conflict resolution. Immediately after successful MCO, security and basic government functions must be reestablished quickly. If a civilian population does not feel secure, they are not likely to be a supporter of changes being undertaken or to support changes in the government. Security is a necessary prerequisite for successful economic and political reforms. The population's support of an insurgency is directly linked to their confidence toward security. Decisions made in Iraq such as the force size required for post combat operations, government de-Ba'athification, disbandment of the Iraqi Army, failure to establish law and order, along with a lack of cultural and religious understanding, led directly to instability and undoubtedly to the growth of the insurgency. Understanding the culture, religion, and concerns of local populations and how to properly provide security and basic governmental functions is critical to overall success. The military strength allocated to an invasion must be adequate not only to defeat the enemy in battle, but also to ensure law and order after the fighting stops. This ensures the population that the new government is legitimate and willing to become active in preventing or expelling the insurgents.

Timing is central to success and the time to beat an insurgency is before it has the opportunity to develop. The ability to quickly provide security and to control violence during phase IV will enable reconstruction and achieve the greatest chance for a lasting peace. The rule of law must be established and criminal activity must be stopped. Insurgents must be captured or killed and collateral damage must be reduced if not eliminated. The quicker these activities occur the higher the possibility of preventing an insurgency before it truly begins.

Legitimacy of the government in the eyes of local populations is vital for success. The ability to secure population centers and infrastructure, maintain order, provide humanitarian relief, and facilitate such fundamental services as electrical power, potable water, and garbage

collection is critical to legitimizing host governments and separating the insurgent from the population. These ideas may take years to accomplish and are not immediately inherent in the American Way of War. The coalition invaded Iraq, destroyed Saddam's Army and removed his government without a clear understood strategy for providing basic legitimate needs such as security or daily administration activities (water, electricity, trash removal, city administration, etc...). Throughout history insurgencies develop from a government's inability or unwillingness to meet the legitimate needs of its people.²⁶ When the national, provincial and city governments in Iraq were removed, the United States led coalition, by default, assumed responsibility for those basic functions.

In the chaotic conditions that typically occur immediately following combat, arguably a military force is the only organization capable of stabilizing the environment. Post combat 'civil affairs' is a vital part of an invasion strategy, and requires as much careful preparation as any other major combat operation factor. The U. S. military has routinely played a major role in civil governments after combat, especially when a regime change occurred or when local governments were either weak or non-functional. In OIF-I, this problem was not properly recognized by strategic, operational or tactical leaders. Had these commanders taken a harder look at the importance of civil-military relationships throughout United States history, these problems should have been identified. That the military was required to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq should not have been a surprise.

Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) operations will begin earlier in some areas than in others. Many factors create this effect but the most basic reason is that security will be established more quickly in some places than in others. There are many historical examples where pockets of stability occurred while other areas remain unstable or in complete control of an enemy force. The Philippines insurgency provides a good example where pockets of stable and unstable areas occurred on the same battlefield. U. S. forces found themselves operating in secure towns where villages several miles away were unstable or under control of the insurgent. Following the Normandy invasion in WW II, stability operations occurred in Europe in a much more linear fashion. S&R operations began immediately in areas that were secured as the fighting continued across France. This occurrence continued as allied armies moved into Germany and toward Berlin. During OIF-I, southern cities along the Euphrates River were secured at least four days before security was established in Baghdad and throughout the country. Today there are areas that are much more secure and stable than others. Future forces need to train to the standard of fighting MCO in some areas and conducting reconstruction operations in others. It is important to examine each of these observations in

relation to each other and how the United States has solved similar situations to OIF / OEF in the past. Recognizing the mistakes in OIF-I pre-combat planning should help with an understanding of what needs to be accomplished before and during future operations.

Recommendations

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war *on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.*²⁷

Although planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq began just a few weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, attention to post-conflict operations (phase IV) was ineffective and in many cases completely overlooked. There was apparent confusion on whether the Department of Defense (DoD) or the Department of State (DoS) had lead planning responsibility. Many of the planning assumptions were overly optimistic, naïve and in some cases just flat wrong. The reason every level of command from the strategic to tactical ineffectively planned for post conflict operations may be found in our American culture. Currently we excel in fighting wars and think of resolving R&S issues as a separate event after major combat operations are complete. To be successful in future operations the importance of close direct coordination between the military and the civil authorities can not be over stated. Political desired end states and strategic objectives must be well defined and understood early and then adjusted and disseminated as the situation changes. A critical component of any operation today is the involvement of joint, interagency, multinational and coalition partners in order to bring manpower, expertise and legitimacy to the situation. Based on the principles of conflict resolution, the “American Way of War” and a few historical examples, three changes need to occur into prevent these same mistakes during the next major combat operation.

Strategic

First and foremost is the empowerment of the Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CSR). President Bush created this position with the National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) specifically to coordinate a coalition and interagency organization designed for reconstruction type operations. This directive was published in December 2005; two years after initial Stability & Reconstruction operations began in Iraq. By clearly establishing the Secretary of State as the lead agency in planning these operations, the President has established responsibility for execution and a chain of command between senior officials. As departmental heads of the U. S. Government,

Secretary of State Collin Powell and Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld did not work as well together during the lead-up to OIF-I.²⁸ This interagency rivalry at the highest levels may explain why there was a lack of focus on phase IV planning at the national level. To be effective the S/CSR must be supported by the President and the Congress including priority for personnel, money and resources. This priority must include a broad spectrum of experts throughout government and industry. It must be focused on development of basic governmental functions from local to national level. The team must be fully developed now and be given a broad spectrum of powers related to nation-building. The fact that LTG(R) Jay Gardner (the appointed head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)) was not able to assemble the interagency planning team for OIF earlier than two weeks prior to the ground war commencing was another indicator that phase IV planning was severely flawed.²⁹ Once major combat operations are required the plan S/CSR develops should be handed to the combatant commander for refinement and coordinated to operations being executed by the coalition's armed forces. To be successful in combat resolution all elements of national power must be engaged early and unity of effort must be focused through the combatant commander. Although much work recently has been accomplished in developing interagency relationships, clear procedures must be established at each level on how the resources of the United States and coalition partners are employed to achieve the desired end states.

The question of what occurs after the destruction of a country's military force must be addressed. Lack of coordination at the strategic level between DoD & DoS creates confusion at all subsequent levels in the military and throughout the interagency. Without a clear understanding of the desired political end states and the military commander's intent (at all levels) tactical units will execute what they believe accomplishes the mission. Based on the creation of S/CSR and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) now at each combatant command, all organizational structures from national through tactical levels should be readdressed and the command and control relationships redefined. Unity of command through the combatant commander will greatly assist the operational and tactical commanders and coordinators who must execute the mission. If the coordination is achieved at the national level and not at the operational or tactical level, the United States effort will be inefficient but more than likely the operation will quickly become completely ineffective. At the very least these relationships must be reviewed to insure unity of effort if we are going to be successful in current and future Stability & Reconstruction Operations.

Operational

The second major change follows the newly formed combatant command JIACGs. This organization provides unprecedented interagency planning and tracking capability to the combatant commander. These organizations will become more efficient if supported by executive order and quality personnel from all agencies are assigned to each position. Based on the success in Japan and Germany after WWII, a review should be conducted of the procedures used between civil administrators and military leaders for the creation of government after the conclusion of MCO.³⁰

The current National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44)³¹ the development of S/CRS³² and with the DoD Directive 3000.05 addressing military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,³³ are examples of progress toward this goal. This governmental reorganization has the potential to fix the issues that caused the lack of coherent planning for post-combat operations in Iraq and to provide focus toward longer range stability and reconstruction issues. If these initiatives are not followed with priorities for resources, specifically money and quality people, a congressional act may be required to force interagency integration like the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 did to improve joint integration across the Department of Defense.³⁴

Tactical

The third major change required to be successful in current and future S&R operations is in the education of officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), specifically, during all military education, training events and self development. The focus should be on the general understanding of different cultures throughout the world, appreciation of historical civil-military relationships and the understanding of inter-governmental agencies. Military personnel across the services must develop language skills and an appreciation for cultural differences throughout the world. The military must develop and train the skills required to disconnect insurgents from the local population and build support for new governments. The overall purpose should be to educate junior leaders and prepare them to operate in the full spectrum of conflict including future S&R operations. The education of field grade officers and senior leaders should include how to prevent an insurgency from beginning and on building partnerships and legitimacy with a new government. This education must be focused on “how to think” in the current security environment and stay away from solutions that teach exactly “what to think” for a given situation. In today’s Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) environment education and adaptability are extremely important to understand cultural

differences and to prevent mirror imaging. Current and future warfare demands strategic leaders have the intellectual agility and adaptability to adjust rapidly to vastly different missions across the full-spectrum of operations, at all levels of war and in a joint, interagency, multinational environment.

The third major change that I believe will make a difference is the inclusion of S&R operations at home-station training and during Combat Training Center rotations. The more often soldiers train on these tasks the more likely they will have a better understanding of what is required in the absence of specific orders. This skill is extremely critical in vague combat situations that often occur between regime changes. If properly resourced and given a clear understanding of the commander's intent, there is very little that the U.S. military can not accomplish. The challenge is continual assessment to ensure soldiers receive proper training and understanding of the environment, proper intent and mission type instructions, national priorities and receipt of required resources. Leader education should seek to produce officers and senior noncommissioned officers who are able to solve complicated problems in joint and interagency contexts during operations from combat to conflict resolution.³⁵ Multiple tours outside the Army's mainstream units will also provide the developing strategic leader with opportunities to observe this joint and interagency environment. Life long self-development and education is important for career advancement but working with non-Army organizations and cultures is now critical to prepare for fighting in the current diverse VUCA environment.

This adjusted education would better assist American strategic leaders work through conflict resolution and assist in identifying obtainable long-term political objectives. Well educated military leaders best support the administration by analyzing all instruments of national power rather than just the military option. The conflict resolution goals must be politically inter-related objectives and provide options to the National Security Council and the administration that not only focus on destruction of an enemy military force and a change of regime but also guarantees the accomplishment of long-term national goals.

The United States led coalition in Iraq missed an early opportunity to defeat the insurgency and provide stability by failing to properly plan and assign overall responsibility to execute a comprehensive stability and reconstruction operations at the conclusion of major combat. Planning for conflict termination and post-conflict success requires conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states; providing for adequate intelligence and signaling; ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization.³⁶ When considering conflict resolution throughout the planning process and executing the plan quickly and efficiently

during and following major combat operations, a newly established government can promptly achieve legitimacy and defeat an emerging insurgency.

The creation of the coordinator for stability and reconstruction at the DoS and the development of JIACGs at each combatant command has the potential to streamline the planning process and to reduce the interagency friction that is inherent in planning large U.S. Government post conflict operations. These organizations along with an assignment process and a training focus toward history, American and foreign culture, interagency understanding, and decision-making skills required in a VUCA environment will lead to a greater understanding of requirements for post combat stability and reconstruction operations and a much higher chance of success for conflict resolution.

Conclusion

These operations are not new to the U.S. military. The Army specifically has been involved with civil-military operations from the inception as minutemen during the Revolutionary War. In the past and in the future, military forces will be responsible immediately following major combat to provide stability and conduct reconstruction operations. Although S&R operations should include all elements of national power the U. S. military is currently playing a primary role and has done so throughout the nation's history.

The military should expect to be involved in these operations in the future because it is arguably the only organization in the United States that has the command structure, personnel, equipment and security capability to organize and execute these missions during and immediately following combat. To be completely successful in these operations, however the military will require other agency experts to articulate national strategic desired end states and objectives. These experts must be integrated in operational planning. They must also be willing to support tactical execution. Advisors with expertise in governance, economics, infrastructure and other functions required to manage populations will greatly improve the military commander's ability to support the population. Even assuming that a DoS led coalition is created and the interagency directs stability and reconstruction operations, it will be the professional tactical military officer that will execute the stability and reconstruction missions on the ground. During United States only or coalition led operations the American soldier will always be required during phase IV and therefore he should plan accordingly.

Endnotes

¹ Aamer Madhani, "Soldiers cross Euphrates, take control of bridges around Samawah," *Chicago Tribune*, Saturday, April 5, 2003.

² Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, David Tohn, *On Point The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004., 281.

³ General George S. Patton, "Speech to the Third Army," 5 June 1944. "Now, I want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country."

⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd revised ed. New York: Penguin, 1954, 1967, 1991, 366.

⁵ U. S. Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.201 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of the Army, 30 April 2003), 1-3.

⁶ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd revised ed. New York: Penguin, 1954, 1967, 1991.

⁷ William Flavin, "Planning for conflict termination and post-conflict success", *Parameters*, Autumn 2003, 95

⁸ U. S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), Chapter 5.

⁹ Colin S. Gray. "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?", Carlisle Barracks, PA: External Research Associates Program, U.S. Army War College, March 2006., 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

1. Apolitical-politics are for politicians,
2. Astrategic-worry about peace and politics after the fighting is complete,
3. Ahistorical-history is in the past, we are looking forward,
4. Problem-Solving, Optimistic-not easily discouraged or deflected (sometimes to a fault),
5. Culturally Challenged-traditionally not focused on others beliefs, habits or behaviors,
6. Technologically Dependent-there is a technological answer to the problem,
7. Firepower Focused-strong belief in the use of overwhelming firepower,
8. Large-Scale-bigger is better,
9. Aggressive, Offensive-take the war to the enemy,
10. Profoundly Regular-traditionally we've design and train the force for a conventional fight,
11. Impatient-war is evil and must be won as rapidly and decisively as possible,
12. Logistically Excellent-amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics, and

13. Sensitivity to Casualties-our leadership, technology, speed and firepower greatly reduces risk.

¹¹ Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 595 - 600.

¹² Jeffery Record, "Vietnam in Retrospect: Could We Have Won?", *Parameters*, Winter 1996-97, 51-65.

¹³ George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, DC: The White House, September 2006.

¹⁴ Jim Garamone, "Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives", Washington, American Forces Press Service, 21 March 2003.

¹⁵ Michael Lind. "Powell Doctrine is Set to Sway Presidents", New America Foundation, The Financial Times, November 7, 2006.

¹⁶ Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

¹⁷ Conrad C Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won" *Military Review*. Fort Leavenworth: May/Jun 2005.Vol. 85, Iss. 3; 28.

¹⁸ Instructions For The Government Of Armies Of The United States In The Field, Prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by President Lincoln, 24 April 1863, available from http://lawofwar.org/general_order_100.htm; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

¹⁹ Tom Donnelly & Vance Serchuk "U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War", Project for the New American Century, Washington, DC 20036, 4. available from <http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20031103.htm>; Internet; 7 March 2007.

²⁰ Ibid., 5.

²¹ Correlli Barnet, "Post-conquest Civil Affairs: Comparing War's End in Iraq and in Germany" February 2005, The Foreign Policy Centre, London United Kingdom.

²² United States Army and Navy, Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, Field Manual 27-5, 22 December 1943. Available from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/mil_gov-civil_affairs.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

²³ Daniel Schorr, "Is it too early to say 'no more Iraqs' ?", The Christian Science Monitor, July 01, 2005.

²⁴ Peter Slevin and Dana Priest; "Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors", The Washington Post, July 24, 2003. Section: A, A1.

²⁵ Aamer Madhani, "Soldiers cross Euphrates, take control of bridges around Samawah," *Chicago Tribune*, Saturday, April 5, 2003.

²⁶ United States Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.201 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 30 April 2003), 1-3.

²⁷ Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976., 88.

²⁸ Michael Duffy and Massimo Calabresi "Clash of the Administration Titans" *Time Magazine*, Saturday, 05 Apr. 2003. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,441132,00.html>

²⁹ Nadia Schadow, "War and the Art of Governance" *Parameters*, (Autumn 2003): 89.

³⁰ United States Army and Navy, *Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, Field Manual 27-5, 22 December 1943. Available from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/mil_gov-civil_affairs.pdf; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

³¹ National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD 44) "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," 7 December 2005. available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

³² Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Home Page, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

³³ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations", November 28, 2005, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm> Internet; accessed 13 December 2006.

³⁴ Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 71-81.

³⁵ Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, David Tohn, *On Point The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. Chapter 8, Transition.

³⁶ William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and post-conflict Success," *Parameters*, vol. 33, no. 3, Autumn 2003, 50.

